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ABSTRACT
When a negotiating agent is presented with an oer by its
opponent, it is faced with a decision: it can accept the of-
fer that is currently on the table, or it can reject it and
continue the negotiation. Both options involve an inherent
risk: continuing the negotiation carries the risk of forgoing
a possibly optimal oer, whereas accepting runs the risk of
missing out on an even better future oer. We approach the
decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision prob-
lem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process.
We argue that this is a natural choice in the context of a
negotiation with incomplete information, where the future
behavior of the opponent is uncertain. We determine the
optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes
and we present an approach to estimate the expected range
of oers when the type of opponent is unknown. We apply
our method against a wide range of opponents, and compare
its performance with acceptance mechanisms of state-of-the-
art negotiation strategies. The experiments show that the
proposed approach is able to nd the optimal time to ac-
cept, and improves upon widely used existing acceptance
mechanisms.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Articial Intelligence]: Distributed Articial In-
telligence|intelligent agents, multi-agent systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Experimentation, Performance, Theory
Keywords
Negotiation; Acceptance strategy; Optimal stopping
1. INTRODUCTION
Suppose two parties A and B are conducting a negotia-
tion, and B has just proposed an oer to A. A is now faced
with a decision: she must decide whether to continue, or to
accept the oer that is currently on the table. On the one
hand, accepting the oer and ending the negotiation means
running the risk of missing out on a better deal in the future.
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On the other hand, carrying on with the negotiation involves
a risk as well, as this gives up the possibility of accepting one
of the previous oers. How then, should A decide whether
to end or to continue the negotiation?
Of course, A's decision making process will depend on
the current oer, as well as the oers that A can expect
to receive from B in the future. However, in most realistic
cases, agents have only incomplete information about each
other [5, 9, 15]. In this paper, we explore in particular the
setting where the opponent has only limited or no knowledge
of A's preferences, and the proposals that A receives will
therefore be necessarily uncertain. This makes A's task of
predicting B's future oers by no means an easy one.
Moreover, predicting B's future oers is only part of the
solution: even when A can predict B's moves reasonably
well, A still has to decide how to put this information to
good use. In other words, even when a probability distribu-
tion over the opponent's actions is known, it is not straight-
forward to translate this into eective negotiation behavior.
As an extreme example, consider an opponent R (for Ran-
dom) who will make random oers with utility uniformly
distributed in [0;1]. Suppose furthermore that we can ex-
pect to receive two more bids from R until the deadline
occurs. R currently makes an oer of utility x 2 [0;1]; for
what x should we accept? Of course, an even better bid
than x might come up in one of the two remaining rounds;
on the other hand, it might be safer to settle for this bid
if x is large enough. For this particular case, we will prove
that there is an optimal acceptance strategy, and we show
exactly for what x to accept (see Section 3).
The main contribution of this paper is that we address
both of A's problems: rst, at every stage of the negotia-
tion, we provide a technique to estimate the bidding behav-
ior of various opponent classes by modeling A's dilemma as a
stochastic decision problem. For particular opponent classes
we are able to provide precise models, and to formulate ex-
act mathematical solutions to our problem. For the second
step, using the ranges found earlier, we borrow techniques
from optimal stopping theory to nd generic, optimal rules
for when to accept against a variety of opponents in a bilat-
eral negotiation setting with incomplete information. The
solutions proposed are optimal in the sense that there can
be no better strategy in terms of utility.
We begin by introducing our approach in Section 2, and
we apply our methods to nd optimal rules in the specic
case of opponents that bid randomly in Section 3. We then
build upon these cases and subsequently work out more re-
alistic scenarios in the following sections. In Section 4, weexplore opponents that change their behavior over time, and
we determine optimal stopping rules when good estimates
of their bidding behavior are known. We extend these re-
sults by combining our approach with a state-of-the-art pre-
diction mechanism, and we demonstrate that our approach
outperforms existing accepting mechanisms, even when the
opponent's behavior is unknown.
2. DECISION MAKING IN NEGOTIATION
UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In this work we focus on a bilateral automated negoti-
ation, wherein two agents try to reach an agreement while
maximizing their own utility. Agents use the widely-employed
alternating-oers protocol for bilateral negotiations [21], in
which the negotiating parties take turns in exchanging of-
fers for a xed number of rounds N. In case the deadline
is reached before both parties come to an agreement, both
receive zero utility. A negotiation scenario consists of the
negotiation domain, which species the setting and all pos-
sible bids, together with a privately-known preference prole
for each party. A preference prole is described by a util-
ity function u(x), which maps each possible outcome x in
the negotiation domain to a utility in the range [0;1]. If an
agent receives an oer x, its acceptance mechanism has to
decide whether u(x) is high enough to be acceptable.
2.1 Stochastic Behavior in Negotiation
Suppose player B is involved in a bilateral negotiation
with private preference information, and at some point in
time, he has decided that he is satised with a utility around
u, called his target utility. However, there are many possible
bids with approximately this utility for player B. As usual,
we call this set of bids X the iso-level bids with utility u.
As player B is indierent between these bids, B may at-
tempt to optimize player A's utility in order to maximize
the chance of an agreement. But this is dicult for B to
achieve, as he does not know A's preferences. When using
the alternating oers protocol, player B cannot simply send
out all considered oers as one bundle, but instead, he can
only oer them sequentially. Player B typically continues to
select dierent bids from X until his target utility changes;
then a new set of iso-level bids is generated, and the process
starts again. The order in which player B picks bids from
the set of equally preferred bids X will dier per player, but
due to incomplete information, he can only select a bid with
a particular opponent utility with limited certainty. There-
fore, we can reasonably model the oers that are presented
to A as a stochastic process.
This kind of stochastic behavior can be observed in prac-
tice in the Automated Negotiating Agents Competition [1,
2]. ANAC is a yearly international competition in which
negotiation agents compete in an incomplete information
setting. Half of the participants [1, 3, 7, 13, 24] were not
designed to explicitly optimize opponent utility and there-
fore, with the limited information available, simply selected
a random element from X; others used opponent modeling
techniques that estimate the opponent's preferences in order
to select bids closer to the Pareto optimal frontier. However,
opponent modeling is seldom capable of making perfect es-
timates [20]. Consequently, even when player B employs
an opponent modeling technique, A will still receive bids of
varying utility. Moreover, the agents usually already antici-
pated the limitations of their opponent model, and therefore
randomly chose among the estimated top bids for the oppo-
nent [11, 16], adding even further to the random appearance
of the utility of their bids. As a result, the negotiation traces
of ANAC 2011 showed to a very large extent the stochastic
behavior discussed above (see also Figure 1). Only 25% of
the negotiation moves were an improvement for the oppo-
nent over the previous bid; the other 75% of the moves could
be classied as selsh, unfortunate, or silent [4].
Figure 1: Despite the fact that Side B concedes pre-
dictably over time, the utility of the oers seem to
be randomly distributed around the [0:4;0:8] inter-
val for Side A, and as a result, the best bids for A
occur during the middle of the negotiation.
2.2 Optimal Stopping in Negotiation
We can frame the problem of accepting a bid as an opti-
mal stopping problem [6], in which an agent is faced with
the dilemma of choosing when to take a particular action,
in order to maximize an expected reward or minimize an
expected cost. In such problems, observations are taken se-
quentially, and at each stage, one either chooses to stop to
collect, or to continue and take the next observation (usually
at some specied sampling cost).
The model of bid reception is as follows: at each of a
total of N rounds, we receive a bid, which has an associated
utility, or value, drawn from a random variable over the
unit interval. At this point, we must decide whether to
accept the bid, or not. Once we accept, the deal is settled
and the negotiation ends. If we continue, then there is no
possibility of recalling passed-up oers; i.e., previous oers
are unavailable unless they are presented to us again. Hence,
at each round, we must decide to either continue or to stop
participating in the negotiation, and we wish to act so as
to maximize the expected net gain. Once an oer is turned
down, and we decide to wait for another bid (at a cost C),
the total number of remaining observations decreases by one.
We will develop the theory here for arbitrary sampling cost
C, but in the remainder of the paper, we will assume the
cost to be zero.
At every stage, the current situation may be described
by a state (j;x), which is characterized by two parameters:
the number of remaining observations j 2 N, and the latest
received oer x 2 [0;1]. Let the utility distribution with j
rounds remaining be given by a random variable Xj, with
associated distribution function Fj. We can think of Xj
as the possible utilities we receive when the opponent makesiso-level bids, and Fj(u) represents the probability of receiv-
ing a bid with utility less than or equal to u. The expected
payo is then given by
V (j;x) = max(x;E(V (j   1;Xj 1))   C); (1)
where we abbreviate the second term E(V (j 1;Xj 1)) C
as vj. This represents the expected value of rejecting the
oer at (j;x), and going on for (at least) one more period.
Note that vj does not depend on x. Thus, using the substi-
tution, we get
vj = E(max(Xj 1;E(V (j   2;Xj 2))   C)   C;
which leads to the following recurrence relation:

v0 = 0;
vj = E(max(Xj 1;vj 1))   C: (2)
In [6, 17] it is proven that for any s 2 R, and for any random
variable X with distribution function F for which E(X) is
nite, the following holds:
E(max(X;s)) = s + TF(s);
with
TF(s) =
Z 1
s
(1   F(t))dt:
And therefore the recurrence relation describing vj can be
written as
vj = vj 1 +
Z 1
vj 1
(1   Fj 1(t))dt   C: (3)
Thus, if we know the distribution Fj for every j, we can
compute the values vj using the above recurrence relation.
Then, deciding whether to accept an oer x is simple: if x 
vj we accept, otherwise we reject the oer (see Algorithm 1).
There is however, a serious impediment to using our stochas-
tic decision model in practice: we do not know the distri-
butions of the utility that the opponent will present to us
in the upcoming rounds; furthermore, the distributions are
highly inuenced by the specics of the negotiation scenario.
However, against specic classes of opponents, we are able
to establish these probabilities, and in an exact way. We will
rst focus our attention on theoretical cases that resemble
the relevant cases encountered in practice. In order to de-
velop the theory, we will rst take on the extreme case of
random opponent behavior, and gradually add complexity
as we proceed.
Of course, in a general setting we do not know the op-
ponent's behavior, and in that case we require a method to
determine the distributions Xj for every remaining round j.
This means that for every round, we need to estimate the
probability of receiving certain utility in our utility space.
This is the most dicult case, which we will cover at the
end of the paper.
All in all, we consider three dierent opponent classes:
1. Random behavior: xed and known uniform Xj in ev-
ery round; this is solved mathematically in Section 3.
2. Known time-dependent behavior: changing, but known
uniform Xj; this is optimally solved in Section 4.1.
3. Unknown time-dependent behavior: changing and un-
known arbitrary Xj; covered in Section 4.2.
We will start with the rst case, where we consider random
opponent behavior.
3. ACCEPTING RANDOM OFFERS
Suppose an agent A is negotiating with its opponent, and
the deadline is approaching, so both agents have only a few
more oers to exchange. As argued above, the opponent will
often oer bids with varying utility for A, due to its incom-
plete information of what A exactly wants. This means that
from A's point of view, the utility of the presented oers will
have a particular stochastic distribution. The aim of A is
then to pick the best one given the limited time that is left.
We start by studying the extreme case of a maximally
unpredictable opponent, or Random Walker (also known as
the Zero Intelligence strategy [12]), who makes random bids
at every stage of the negotiation. We rst solve this case
analytically, before moving on to more complicated settings.
3.1 Uniformly Random Behavior
Using equation (2), we can determine the optimal solution
against Random Walker, using the added knowledge that
every Xj does not depend on the number of rounds left, and
assuming every Xj is uniformly distributed:
Proposition 3.1. Against an opponent who makes ran-
dom bids of utility uniformly distributed in [0;1], and with j
oers still to be observed, one should accept an oer of util-
ity x exactly when x  vj, where vj satises the following
equation:

v0 = 0;
vj =
1
2 +
1
2v
2
j 1; (4)
This recurrence relation has the following properties: vj is
monotonically increasing, and
lim
j!1
vj = 1:
Proof. Let X be the uniform distribution over [0;1] with
distribution function F. Playing against Random Walker,
all Xj's are uniform distributions over [0;1] and hence equal
to X. This yields:
TF(s) =
Z 1
s
(1   F(t))dt (5)
=
8
<
:
1
2   s; s < 0:
1
2(1   s)
2; 0  s  1:
0; s > 1:
(6)
Since we are in the case 0  s  1, we get:
vj = vj 1 +
1
2
(1   vj 1)
2 =
1
2
+
1
2
v
2
j 1:
It is easy to show with recursion that
1  
2
j
< vj 1 < vj < 1;
and therefore,
lim
j!1
vj = 1:
When we substitute vj = 1 2xj in equation (4), we get the
equivalent relation of the logistic map xj = xj 1(1 xj 1) at
r = 1, which due to its chaotic behavior does not in general
have an analytical solution. However, we have visualized its
behavior for j 2 [0;200] in Figure 3 (uniform case). From
this, we see that the answer to the question posed in the
introduction is as follows: with two rounds to go, one should
accept an oer x exactly when x  v2 = 0:625.Algorithm 1: Optimal Stopping main decision body
Input: The number of remaining rounds j, and the last
received bid x by the opponent.
Output: Acceptance or rejection of x.
begin
oeredUtility    getUtility(x);
target    determine(vj);
if oeredUtility  target then
return Accept
else
return Reject // And send a counter-offer
In the uniform case (cf. Figure 4), it obtains the highest
score possible both in 10 and in 100 rounds, getting respec-
tively 86% and 98% of the pie on average. Note that this is
exactly equal to the theoretical values v10 and v100 shown
in the uniform case of Figure 3.
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Figure 4: The optimal stopping condition outper-
forms all ANAC agents against uniform Random
Walker for 10 and 100 rounds. Average utility plot-
ted over 5000 runs; the errors bars indicate one stan-
dard deviation to the mean.
On England-Zimbabwe (cf. Figure 5), the optimal stop-
per obtains less utility for N = 10 in an absolute sense
compared to the uniform case, but the results are even more
pronounced relative to the other agents. A moment of re-
ection makes clear why: given the clustering of bids of
medium utility (see Figure 2a), there is less chance for Ran-
dom Walker to propose a very fortunate bid for the oppo-
nent. This explains why the acceptance criteria of the other
agents perform relatively worse. Note that the end result
obtained by the optimal stopper is approximately 0:79 and
0:93 for N = 10 and N = 100 respectively, which is again
equal to the optimal values v10 and v100 shown in the E-Z
case of Figure 3.
3.4 When Optimal Stopping Is Most Effective
As is evident from the results, optimal stopping performs
better than the other agents against Random Walker. This
is to be expected given the fact that no agent could possibly
do better; however, the dierence with the current state-of-
the-art is surprisingly big in some cases, for example com-
pared to the ANAC 2010 winner, Agent K [13], and even
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
N=10
N=100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
N=10
N=100
Figure 5: The optimal stopping condition outper-
forms all ANAC agents against Random Walker on
England-Zimbabwe for N = 10 and N = 100 rounds;
utility averaged over 5000 runs.
more so when the number of rounds is limited. The reason is
that many of the currently used acceptance mechanisms are
rather straightforward, and only become successful against
Random Walker when enough time is available.
This can be illustrated by considering the baseline accep-
tance condition where an agent accepts if and only if the
oered utility is above a xed threshold , as is done by
various agents [13, 24, 25]. In the uniform case, its expected
utility obtained over N rounds equals the probability it will
obtain an oer above  multiplied by the expected utility
above :
(1   
N) 
 + 1
2
(7)
This is not a very ecient acceptance condition for small
N; for example, for N = 2, the optimal value of  (i.e.,
the value of  that maximizes formula (7)) is
1
3, with ex-
pected utility of 0:593, while the optimal value that can be
obtained is v2 = 0:625. However, for large N, choosing 
close to one is already surprisingly ecient. For example,
for N = 100, the optimal value of  is 0:948, with expected
utility of 0:969. This is already quite close to the optimal
value of v100 = 0:981; this indicates that in case bids are
randomly distributed, the added value of optimal stopping
lies primarily in negotiations with a limited amount of total
rounds, or when only limited time is left in a negotiation.
4. TIME DEPENDENT OFFERS
One of the most restrictive assumptions so far was to as-
sume the opponent plays completely randomly. As we ar-
gued, this is a sensible assumption when modeling an oppo-
nent that is extremely unpredictable due to imperfect infor-
mation, but the general case is more complicated. Almost
all negotiation agents change their range of oers over time;
i.e., they are time dependent strategies.
1 Hence, we require
optimal stopping policies for these cases as well.
The challenge of the more general case is that we have
to account for the fact that not only the presented utilities
1Note that these should not be confused with the well-known
time dependent tactics from [8], which are particular kinds
of time dependent strategies.may uctuate, but also the range of future oers may be
dierent at dierent times. Establishing this range is not
easy, because the strategy used by the opponent is of course
unknown to us. The oers of any time dependent oppo-
nent with incomplete information can again be modeled by
a stochastic distribution, but this time the distribution will
change over time. In terms of optimal stopping, this means
that the bid distribution Xj can be dierent for every j.
4.1 Uniformly Unpredictable Offers
If we assume that the opponent's oers are uniformly dis-
tributed, we only need to know the interval of utilities we
can expect in every round. If this is the case, then we are
able to compute the optimal time to accept, as is stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Against a time-dependent opponent who,
with j rounds still to be observed, makes bids uniformly dis-
tributed in Xj = [aj;bj], the optimal stopping cut-o is vj,
where vj satises the following equation:
vj =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0; if j = 0
vj 1; if vj 1  bj 1
bj 1+aj 1
2 ; if vj 1  aj 1
vj 1 +
1
2 
(bj 1 vj 1)2
bj 1 aj 1 ; if aj 1 < vj 1 < bj 1:
Proof. From equation (2), we have
vj = E(max(Xj 1;vj 1));
so immediately, if vj 1  bj 1, then vj 1  Xj 1, and
thus vj = vj 1. On the other hand, if vj 1  aj 1, then
vj = E(X) =
bj 1+aj 1
2 . So therefore, the only case left is
aj 1 < vj 1 < bj 1, in which case we derive the following:
vj = P(Xj 1  vj 1)  vj 1 +
P(Xj 1 > vj 1)  P(Xj 1 j Xj 1 > vj 1)
=
vj 1   aj 1
bj 1   aj 1
 vj 1 +
1
2

bj 1   vj 1
bj 1   aj 1
 (vj 1 + bj 1)
= vj 1 +
1
2

(bj 1   vj 1)
2
bj 1   aj 1
:
Note how this proposition is an extension of Proposition 3.1:
if we set Xj = [0;1] for every j, the equation simplies to
vj =
1
2 +
1
2v
2
j 1 again.
Also, we observe that in the special case of perfect infor-
mation, the distributions would be singletons of the form
Xj = fxjg, with probability 1 for the outcome xj. The
equation of Proposition 4.1 then simplies to
vj =

0; if j = 0
max(xj 1;vj 1); otherwise:
= max
0k<j
xk:
This means that the optimal stopping procedure has the
desirable property that when it gets perfect estimates as
input, it will also produce perfect output.
4.2 Arbitrarily Unpredictable Offers
Proposition 4.1 is useful to gain insight into the opti-
mal acceptance policy, but in practice, the distributions Xj
are neither known, nor uniformly distributed, and therefore
an estimation method is required against arbitrary oppo-
nents. Of course, the success of the optimal stopping rules
will greatly depend on the delity of the estimating tech-
nique used to predict the opponent's behavior. Therefore,
we rst examine the case of a perfect estimator, to see how
our method performs in the ideal case. After that, we will
move our focus to an estimator that can be used in practice.
4.2.1 Opponent Prediction Using Perfect Estimates
The perfect estimation method that we employ divides the
number of rounds N into a number of time slots S. Then, by
momentarily using perfect information, it gets the minimum
and maximum utility that will be oered by the opponent
during that time slot. This allows us to control exactly the
precision of the estimate, where using more slots emulates
having more information about the opponent's behavior. If
we set the number of slots equal to the total number of
rounds, we are in a full information state and the perfor-
mance should be theoretically optimal. If we use only one
slot, we have less information, knowing only the opponent's
utility range over the entire N rounds.
4.2.2 Opponent Prediction Using Gaussian Process
Regression
Finally, we consider an estimation method that uses as
input only the information that can be observed during the
negotiation, namely the utility of the oers made by the op-
ponent. For this, we opted for a Gaussian process regression
(GPR) technique as described in [24]. We selected the GPR
technique because it can be computed in real time during
the negotiation, and it is specically designed to be robust
with respect to signicantly varying observations. It works
as follows: for each oer made by the opponent, the round at
which the oer was made is recorded, along with the oered
utility. From this, the future concessions of the opponent
are estimated using regression with a Gaussian process. To
reduce the eect of noise, the oers received are aggregated
in a number of time windows, and only the maximum value
that is received in each time window is used as input for the
Gaussian process.
The output of the Gaussian process regression is a normal
distribution for every upcoming round k, with mean k and
standard deviation k. The mean k gives a prediction of
the most likely oered utility value in round k, whilst the
standard deviation k gives an indication of how accurate
the prediction is. When using GPR, the opponent bid dis-
tribution is estimated in real-time by a normal distribution,
truncated to t in the range [0;1].
Algorithm 2: Determining vj
Input: The number of remaining rounds j, and all
negotiation outcomes 
.
Output: vj.
begin
if j = 0 then
return 0
// Use either perfect estimation, or GPR
Yj 1    estimated utility distribution at j   1;
// Use either uniform, or Gaussian
distribution for Xj 1
Xj 1    utility distribution of Yj 1 over 
;
// Recursively determine vj 1
return E(max(Xj 1;vj 1))4.3 Experiments
To analyze the performance of optimal stopping (OS) against
time dependent negotiation strategies, we adopted the same
experimental setup as before, this time testing it with both
perfect estimates and the GPR technique. We set the num-
ber of Gaussian process regressions to 10, and we set the
number of samples equal to the number of rounds (for de-
tails, see [24]).
We used two versions of perfect estimation: the full infor-
mation state by setting S = N (called \perfect estimation
with full slots"), and a version with S = 1 (called \per-
fect estimation with one slot"). We also tested two variants
of the GPR technique: in one, we simply set Xj equal to
the truncated Gaussian distribution with mean j and stan-
dard deviation j as predicted by the GPR technique (called
\Gaussian GPR prediction"). These predictions turned out
to be overly optimistic in most cases, since the GPR tech-
nique uses as input the maximum utility received in each
time slot. Therefore, we opted to include a simplied sec-
ond version, which produces a uniform distribution between
zero and the estimated maximum oered utility, which we
set to  + 2 (called \uniform GPR prediction"). See also
Algorithm 2.
As the specics of the negotiation scenario inuences the
behavior of the opponent, we picked a total of six negoti-
ation scenarios from ANAC, aiming for a large spread of
negotiation characteristics (see Table 1).
Scenario Size Opposition
ADG [1] 15625 Low
Amsterdam [1] 3024 Medium
England-Zimbabwe [19] 527 Medium
Nice Or Die [3] 3 High
Itex{Cypress [14] 180 High
Travel [2] 188160 Medium
Table 1: Characteristics of the negotiation scenarios
For the opponents, we selected various TDT's from [8].
Our optimal stopping policy works against any type of time
dependent negotiation strategy, but we selected TDT's be-
cause they are typical, well-known examples of strategies
that change their range of bids over time. Additionally, as
in the case of Random Walker, TDT's are non-adaptive and
hence it is not important what counter-oers are sent out to
them.
We selected the same TDT's used earlier, namely: Hard-
liner, Boulware, Conceder Linear, and Conceder. We gener-
ated many variants of each opponent by choosing the values
0:7, 0:8, and 0:9 for the min parameter (which controls the
utility threshold up to where the agent will concede [8]).
Note that this creates quite a competitive opponent pool,
as the opponents will never fully concede. This leads to
only small utility dierences between the dierent accep-
tance strategies, but this should be regarded an artifact of
our competitive setup. The average score of all agents is
shown in Figure 6.
Optimal stopping with perfect estimation with full slots
should be considered the theoretical upper bound here; and
indeed, it outperforms all other methods. Among the agents
that act with incomplete information, the Boulware agent
obtains a surprisingly good score. Its strategy turns out to
be particularly successful against TDT's since it waits for a
long time to let the opponent concede as much as possible,
until it quickly concedes in the end to obtain an agreement.
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Figure 6: The utilities obtained by ANAC agents
and optimal stopping conditions with dierent esti-
mation methods against time dependent opponents
for 10 and 100 rounds.
However, because it waits for so long, it misses out on good
oers that are oered earlier.
Gaussian GPR prediction is not as successful, mainly be-
cause it was found to overestimate the opponent's willing-
ness to concede, and hence it aimed for too much during
the negotiation. It is optimal stopping with uniform GPR
that performs signicantly best (one-tailed t-test, p < 0:01),
which shows that the optimal stopping policy is indeed a ro-
bust mechanism that can still perform well in an incomplete
information setting.
5. RELATED WORK
As far as the authors are aware, this is the rst work that
deals with the optimal decision on the acceptance of an oer
in a negotiation setting of incomplete information. In many
settings of complete information ([21] is a typical example)
the deal is usually formed right away and as such, sequential
decisions whether to accept do not come into play.
In [26], a sequential decision making framework is also
employed, using similar arguments for using it as we do.
Furthermore, they also choose actions that maximize the
expected payo using a recursive formula; however, their
approach uses Bayesian learning techniques and does not
provide solutions specically aimed at acceptance strategies.
The work by Fatima et al. [10] also treats optimal strate-
gies in an incomplete information setting, but it primar-
ily focuses on bidding strategies in the context of unknown
deadlines and reservation values, and does not deal with ac-
ceptance strategies.
A work that comes closest to ours is [22], where optimal
stopping is employed to decide when a party should reach
an agreement in the context of conict resolution. In con-
trast to our work, the scope of the paper is limited to simple
bargaining games, and deals with one-sided incomplete in-
formation only.
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper deals with the question of when to accept in a
bilateral negotiation with incomplete information. Our ap-
proach has been to model the opponent's bids as a stochasticprocess, and to regard the decision of when to accept as a se-
quential decision problem. We rst determined the optimal
acceptance policies for particular opponent classes of which
we were able to predict the behavior well. Of course, in the
general case of unknown opponents, the solutions are only as
good as the estimation of the opponent's behavior. We have
shown however, that our techniques are robust, in the sense
that they also perform well in practice. This demonstrates
that our optimal stopping mechanism is a valuable element
of a negotiating agent's strategy, whether in a complete or
incomplete information setting.
Our work also opens up various lines of possible future
work. First, there is an important aspect of negotiation
that is not included in our model: negotiation is a dynamic
two-party process. The opponent's behavior is inuenced
by whether or not we accept, and by what counter oers we
make. In this paper we focused on the decision of when to
accept, rather than on what counter oer should be gener-
ated in case the oer is unacceptable. Clearly, in practice,
the bidding strategy is also very important in conducting
a successful negotiation, and its eects on the acceptance
strategy are yet to be determined.
Second, our model already incorporates the concept of
negotiation costs, but in this paper we assumed them to be
zero; however, it would be interesting to see the eects of
costs on optimal acceptance behavior. Similarly, we also
plan to study negotiation scenarios that have discounted
payos. Both extensions will incentivize agents to employ
more permissive acceptance conditions. On the other hand,
adding reservation values to the agent's preferences would
make an agent less inclined to accept. Combining this with
discounted scenarios could induce agents to fall back on their
reservation value by ending the negotiation prematurely.
This `outside option' gives rise to a new variety of optimal
acceptance strategies that have to make the optimal choice
between continuing, accepting, or walking away.
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